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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ST. ~TE
.
OF
ROAD

l~TAH,

by and through its

f~OMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Respcrndentf
vs ..

?

THE DE='IV.ER AND RIO GRANDE J~
'VES1~ERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a De1a \vare corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case Nor

9079

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELil\ii~ARY STATRIVIE~T

The parties \vill somctimeH be designated in this brief
as follo,vg: Defendant and Appellant~ The Denver and Rio
Grande \Vestern Railroad Company as the ,;'Rio Grande~~'
Plaintiff and Respondentt State of Utah, by and through
its Road Commis~·don 1 as the ''Road C·ommission~~~ Emphasis
has been supplied.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal presents the question of whether the Road
Commission may lawfully condemn the entire Little Cotton ..
wood Branch of railroad of Rio Grande.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no issue of the adequacy of compensation or
any substantial question of fact in this case. A proper preHentation of the questions of 1aw, however:~ requires an understanding of the facts+
Rio Grande is a common carrier of persons and prop-

erty by rai 1 in intrastate and interstate commerce. Its main
Iine of railroad from Salt Lake City to Colorado points runs
in a north and south direction genera11y along the center
of the Salt Lake Valley. In the City of Midvale this main
line crosses at grade an east and west street known as
Center Street. Near the point of this crossing two branch
lines of Rio Gran de "'s railroad are taken out from its main
Jine (Exhibit P-1) ~

One of these branches kn O"Wll as the ''Little Cottonwood
Branch'~ is taken out of the main 11 ne immediately south of
Center Street and runs in an easter] y direction abutting the
south side of Center Street on premises owned in fee by
Rio Grande a distance of some 3,000 feet and then extends
souther1y crossing State Street and serving industries on
the east side of State Street.. This branch line extends approximately 1. 7 5 miles and has approximately .43 miles of
side tracks~ It had for the year 1957 an assessed valuation
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of $6,526.00. This branch line presently serves directly an
oil company and a coal company, and through a team track
a rock wool company,. a builders supply company~ and other
consignees ( R. 25. 33t 80-83) .
During the calendar year 1956 the gross revenues of
the Little Cottonwood Branch were $21,566.86 (Exhibit
D-13). During the calendar years 1957 and 1958 and for
the first two months of 1959 the carload traffic moving
over the said branch was as follows (Exhibit D-14,. 15 and
16):

Period
Number of Cars
1957
...... - . - . - . 120
1958 . - . . . . . . . . . - . - . . . 142
First Two
Months 1959

48

Cars Moving in
Interstate Commerce
20

61
29

Taking out of said main line immediately north of
Center Street, Rio Grande has another branch line known
as the '~Bingham and Garfield Branch/:t which runs westerly down Center Street of Midvale and serves mines and
industries in the Bingham and Garfield area ( R. 7 4) .
Center Street is a road design ate d by statutes as a part
of the State Road System and is under the jurisdiction of
the State Road Commission~ The right of way owned in
fee by Rio Grande for its Little Cottonwood Branch is approximately 27 feet in width and abuts along and runs
parallel to the south side oi Center Street for a distan~ e of
approximately 3,000 feet. Abutting upon the south side of
such right of \Vay are residential properties owned by r esidents of the City of Midvale (Exhibit P~l). The tracks of
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Rio Grande on its Little Cottonwood Branch are elevated
above the street level of Center Street some 6 to 13 inches
(R~ 43)
The Road Commission, Midvale City and Rio
Grande have since 1954 been considering a plan for the
improvement of Center Street from the point where it
crosses Rio Grande's main line easterly to State Streett
whereby the tracks of Rio Grande on this branch would be
lowered, and the entire area paved over and used as part
of Center Street. After considerable negotiation the form
of agreement for carrying out .such plan was approved by
the Road Commission and on January lOl' 1957, transmitted
to Rio Grande for execution. Rio Grande executed the same
and transmitted it to the Road Commission on July 19, 1957.
The Road Commission never signed the agreement (Exhibits D-3 through D-11). Prior to transmitting the form
of agreement to Rio Grande for the lowering and paving
over of its tracks on Center Street~" the Road Commission
in October or 1\""ovember, 1956~ entered into a contract for
the improvement of Center Street under Project 1580. The
construction under this contract has now been comp1eted.
The project for lo"\vering Rio Grande's tracks and paving
over has never been carried out although it could he completed in about thirty days time (R. 24, 82) .
L

. .~fter having arrived at a basis of agreement with Rio
Grande for the hnvering of its tracks and the paving over
of the track area the Road Commission changed its mind
about completing the street project and asserted that the
Lit tie Cotton,vood Bra11ch should be removed and destroyed
in its entirety. This Rio Grande \\ras unwilling to do~ and
the Road Commission brought this action to condemn the
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entire branch. The reason assigned for such change of position on the part of the Road Commission is the future construction of the Valley Free\vay Project No~ 1-01-7 (3) (R~

38-40).
Project 1-01-7 (3) involves the construction of a freeway hich \\o' i 11 be a part of the interstate road system under
the I!ighvvay Act of 1956~ Thi~ freeway \vill enter Salt
Lake City at a point known generally as the Beck~s Overpass near the Davis County line and ,~. ill extend southerly
through Salt Lake County. The tcnta tive proposal for location contemplates that this freeway will be easterly of and
near Rio Grande'H main line at the point \\-~here the freeway
crosses Center Street (R. 27-28, Exhibit P-1) Three problems require solution in connection \Vith the crossing of the
freeway at this point. (a) The nature of the grade separation between Center Street and the freeway must be
determined. The present proposal is that Center Street
will underpass the freeway (R~ 28). (b) The connection
of the Bingham and Garfield Branch into Rio Grande~s main
line must be relocated. Rio Grande and the Road Commission hHYC not yet agreed upon such relocation (R. 75-76,
84-85) ~ (c) A determination must be made respecting the
connection of the Little C,ottonwood Branch into Rio
Grande's main line+ The Commission proposes that this
eonnection should be destroyed and the entire branch con~
demned (R. 28).

"r

+

On September 24, 1957, hearing was had before the
Court below on the motion of the Road Commission for an
order of immediate occupancy. The motion v;las denied
which order of denial was affirmed by this Court on inter-
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mediate appeal State v. Denver a.fl.d Rio Gmn.d.e Western
Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P . 2d 926.
The cause again came on for hearing before the Court
below on April 6~ 1959. On May 9~ 1959, judgment was
entered vesting in the Road Commission fee simple title to
the entire right of way of the Little Cottonwood Branch of
Rio Grande (R~ 108). From such judgment this appeal is

taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EMPOWERED TO CONDEMN THE ENTIRE BRANCH
OF RIO GRANDE'S RAILROAD.
POINT II
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT

EMPOW~

ERED TO CONDEMN RIO GRANDE"'S BRANCH
OF RAILROAD FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE
USE.

POINT III

THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDEtS BRANCH
OF RAILROAD IS NOT NECESSARY FOR
THE USE OF THE ROAD COMMISSION.

POINT IV
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH
OF RAILROAD IS AN UNLAWFUL INTER . .
FERENCE WITH COMMERCE .
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POINT V

INDISPENSIBLE P A R T I E S DEFENDANT
WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION~

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TilE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EM POWERED TO CONDEMN THE ENTIRE BRANCH
OF RIO GRANDE~s RAILROAD.

This case involves :fundamental questions on the subject of eminent domain~ They have not heretofore been
passed upon by this Court.

In order to determine the legal questions involved it
h~ necessary at the outset to understand the actual effect
of the decree of condemnation. The Road Commission in
this case is seeking essentially to obtain a crossing of Rio
Grande~s Little Cottonwood Branch by the Valley Freeway .
This crossing will be made near the point where such branch
takes out of Rio Grandets main line, and about one hundred
feet east of such main line. The crossing will require a tract
about two hundred feet in width. In order to accomplish
this crossing the decree not only destroys Rio Grande~s
branch at the point of cross]ng but vests the fee ti tie to
the entire branch a mile and three fourths long with all
side tracks in the State Road Commission.
It is elementary that the power of eminent domain rests
in the people. They have vested the exercise of the power
in the legislature.. Subject to constitutional limitations the
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legislature has conferred the power upon certain private
corporations~ municipal corporations and governmental
agenciesr Lewis,. Eminent Domain~ Third Edition, VoL 1~
Section 9.
The rule has been recognized in this jurisdiction that
where the right of eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose~ the statute must be given a liberal construction
in furtherance of such purpose. Mon.etaire Mining Co. v.
Columbus Rexall Comolidated Mine.~ Co. t et al., 53 Utah
413, 17~1 Pac. 172, Freem-an Gulch Mining Co., et aL v.
Kennecott Coppe-r Corporation, 119 F. 2d 16. It is equally
clear~ howevert that the right sought to be exercised. must
be granted in terms or by necessary implication and if not
f; o granted it can not be exercised.. This is clearly r~ognized
in the lJfonetaire case, 8Upra.j where Mr . Justice Frick at
page 421 of the t: tah report ga i d :
''If the right is granted, the court has but one
duty to perform and that is to enforce it and make
it effective. Upon the other hand~ if the right is not
granted~ either in terms or by necessary implic.ation:t
then the courts are po·w·erless to grant the relief a ppellant seeks . ~
t

To the same effect is Lewist Eminent Domaint Third
Edition, Vol. I~ Section 388~ where the rule is stated as follows:
''All grants of power by the government are to
be strictly cons trued~ and this is especially true with
respect to the power of eminent domain~ which is
mo1·e harsh and peremptory, in its exercise and operation than any other. ~An act of this sort/ says
Bland~ J., ~deserves no favor; to construe it liberally
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be sin n! ng against the rights of property.~
But, as in other cases,. such a construction will, if

Vt.tf o u ld

po~~ible,

be given to an act as will carry into effect
the chief and manifest purpose for which it was
passed, and such as will give effect to all its words.
It will be .so construed as to support its validity
rather than otherwise. ~statutes granting these
powers are not to be construed so literally, or so
strict1y as to defeat the evident purpose of the legislature. They are to receive a reasonably strict and
guarded construction, and the powers granted will
extend no further than expressly stated~ or than is
necessary to accomplish the genera1 scope and purpose of the grant. If there remains a doubt as to
the extent of the po\ver, after all reasonable intendment[-"; in its favor, the doubt should he solved adversely to the c1aim of power.''~
Consideration must therefore be given to the Utah
constitutional limitations and the powers conferred upon
the Road Commission by the Legislature4
Section 22, Artic1e I of the Constitution of Utah, provides that
~i Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation."
Section 27-9-4J Utah Code Annotated~ 1953,. under
\vhicb the Road Commission purp<Jrted to acquire the fee

title to the entire Little Cotton""'·ood Branch of Rio Grande
provides that
~~For

the purposes of this act, the highway
authorities of the statet counties,. cities, and to\Vlls
may acquire private or public property and property
rights for limited-a eces s fa ci li ties and service roa rls,
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including rights of accesst air, view, and lightt by
gift, devise, purchase or condemnation in the same
manner as such authorities are now or hereafter may
be authorized by law to acquire such property or
property rights in connection Vlith highways and
streets within their respective jurisdiction~ All property right}; acquired under the provisions of this act
shall be in f.ee simpler In connection with the acqu1sition of property or property rights for any limited~
acces~ facility or portion thereof~ or service road in
connection therewith, the state, county, cityt or town
highway authority may in its discretion~ acquire an
entire 1ot, block, or tract of Jandt if by so doing, the
interests of the public will be best served~ even
though said entire lot~ block, or tract is not immediately needed for the right-of-way proper . 't
t

Th.e power of the Road Commission to exercise the right
of eminent domain is granted by Section 27-2-9, Utah Code
Annotatedt 1953t which as amended by Chapter 43t Laws
of Utaht 1955, pr o'Vides that
county commissioners or the state road
commission are a nthorized to acquire by purchaset
condemnation or otherwise, real property~ or interests therein, to be used in the construction, maintenance~ or operation of state roads, and are authorized to purchasej or otherwise acquiret from any
county} city or other pol i tica1 subdivision of the state,
real property, or interests thereinJ which may be
exchanged for, or used in the purchase of other rea]
property, or interests therein~ to be used in con nee..
ti on \Vith the construetion ~ ma.inte nan ceJ or operation of state roads~ and are authorized to lease, sell
or otherwise dispose of real property acquired by
it for road purposes when such properly is no longer
needed for such purposes. Any such sale may be
made at private or public sale and the proceeds
~~The
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thereof shall be turned over to the state treasurer
and credited to the state road operating fund. In
the disposition of land at any such private sale, first
consideration shall be given to the original grantor
or his successor in interest . Nothing in this section
shall be held to prohibit any county or city from
contributing to the :State road commission real or
personal property for state roa.d purposes~H
The validity of the judgment of condemnation must
therefore be tested in the light of the foregoing eonstitu..
tional limitation and the statutory requirements .
The constitutional provision requires that property
must be taken for a pub1ic use. In the construction of these
words two lines of decisions have developed. One line of
decisions holds that public use means use by the publicthat is~ pubHc employment-and conHequently that to make
a u.se public~ a duty must devolve on the corporation or body
holding property by right of eminent domain to furnish the
public. with the use intended~ and that there must be a right
on the part of the public, or some portion of it, to use the
property after it is condemned. The other line of decisions
has announced the so-called ,;~=ru blic Benefit Doctrine'' and
has arisen in certain states where it was considered a matter of general community welfare to develop such resources
as water, minerals or utility of land, and finds its expression in such cases as Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 28 Utah 215~ 78 Pac . 296~ 200 U. S. 527~ and Clark
v. Nasht 27 Utah 158~ 75 Pac . 371, 198 Ur S. 361. See 18
Am. Jur., Eminent Domain~ Section 36, and Lewis~ Eminent
Domain, Third Edition, VoJume I~ Section 257.
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This difference cf point of view is of no importance
in the case at bar~ however~ for no better example of a public
use can be found that that of a high~~ay, where the ease~
ment or title vests in the public for the common and equal
use of all. Lewis~ Eminent Domain~ Third Editiont Volume
I, Section 259.
If the Valley Freeway were to occupy only the portion
of Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch at the point of
crossing and the condemnation were limited to this areaJ
there could be no doubt that there would be public use of
the property so occupiedr Is it not equa11y clear that there
-will be no public use of Rio Grande's branch of railroad a
mile and three-fourths away. There is not the s1ightest
suggestion or contention here that any part of Rio GrandeJs
property, except that occupied by the proposed freeway
and that abutting upon Center Street ever will or can be
used for high,vay purposes~ Manifestly, it seems to us that
the cond em nation of this en tire branch of railroad is not
the taking of property for public use and is in direct viola.tion of the constitutional limitation~
Turning to a consideration of the statutory provisions
27-9-4~

provides that the
Road Commission may acquire an entire lot, block~ or tract
of landt if by so doing, the interests of the public will be
best servedt even though said entire lot~ block~ or tract of
land is not immediately needed for the right~of-way proper.
These provigions mu~t be read in connection with the foregoing constitutional limitation, for obviously the legislature has the power and only the power to permit property
to be taken for a pub lie us e. The legislature cannot author ..
set forth above, the said Section
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ize the Road Commission or

any other body

to take private

property \\rhieh will not be devoted to a public use. This
proposition is stated by Lewis, Eminent Domainl' Third
Ectition, Volume 2, Secti-on 600, as follows :
''If we consider all the statutes now in force or
'vhich ever have been in force in this country~ providing for the exercise of the eminent domain power~
undoubtedly the great majority have not limited the
taking to what is necessary for the purpose in question. But 'v e think that the constitution impliedly
forbids the taking for public use of what is not necessary for such use and, the ref ore, though the constitution and statute are silent on the subject of
necessity l' that the power to take is, in every case,
Jimited to such and so much property as is necessary
for the public use in question, and that the owner is
entitled, either in the proceedings to condemn or
othenvise~ to be heard upon this question+'~
See also 18 Am. Jur.l' Eminent Domain} Section 110.

Cnder the said Section 27-9-4, the Road Commission
may therefore take on]y 'vhat is reasonably necessary to
accomplish the intended pu b1ic use. Lewis~ Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 2, Section 453.
The proper principle on this subj~t i~, we believe,
stated by the Supreme Court of Io\va in Bennett~ et aL v.
City of 1.ll a1-£on, 76 N. \V. 844, at page 846 as follows :
'~If

the land ~ought to be taken 'vi ll to some
extent conduce to the public use for which it is to
be devoted, the decision of the municipality that it
is necessary therefor should not be interfered \Vith;
other,vise it should be set aside."
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Applying this rule to the facts in the case at bar~ how
can it reasonably be said that a branch oi railway right-ofway more than a mile away from the crossing desired can
possibly be devoted to the public use of the Valley Freeway.
Upon this principle the judgment of the Court condemning
in fee this entire branch of railroad must be set aside.

POINT II
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EMPO\VERED TO CONDEMN RIO GRANDE~s BRANCH
OF RAILROAD FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE
USE.
It should be observed in this case that the judgment
of the court below is not entered under the provisions of
Section 78-34-2~ Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which authorizes only the taking of an easement in the case of highways,
but p urport.s to be entered under said Section 27-9-4~ which
authorizes the taking of a fee~ The taking of a fee is authorized only in the case of limited access highways. The on1y
limited access highway involved here is the Valley Freeway,
which will occupy a parcel some two hundred feet in width
at the crossing of the Little Cotton wood Branch~ To accommodate this crossing the Road Commission is seeking
to take the fee to the entire branch of railroad~
:\I ore over, as the evidence sh o'vs (Exhi bit D -12) if
Center Street underpasses the Valley Freeway and the main
line of Rio Grande, the Bingham and Garfield Branch of
Rio Grande must be relocated~ However~ no solution has
been rea r.he d regarding such re1 oca tion ~ If rei oca ti on js
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not feasible then the plan of underpassing the freeway and
Rio Grande~s main line must be revised. Sueh revision may
obviate entirely the necessity of the destruction of Rio
Grande~s Little Cotton woe d Branch. A cc.ordingly ~ the j udgment vesting fee title in the Road Commission to that branch
may very well be futile and premature. The Road Commission should not be permitted to accomplish such a harsh
and destructive taking unless the necessity therefor 1s
clearly established. To do so is an abuse of its power.

POINT III
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH
OF RAILROAD IS NOT NECESSARY FOR
THE USE OF THE ROAD COMMISSION.
In this brief we have thus far considered an attempted
taking by the Road Commission which we conceive to be
un1awfu1~ It should not be assumed therefrom that appellant is engaged in tactiCB of obstruction~ We well recognize
the importance of hig h'vays~ particularly the interstate
system now in the course of construction.. We recognize also
the responsibilities of the Road Commission in connection
therewith~ 0 ur con cern here is simply that in the haste to
facilitate this highway program fundamental rights should
be recognized and adhered to~

In our view the Road Commission is clothed with ample
power to construct without difficulty all its required facilities in the area involved. The power is found in Subsection
(5) of Section 78-34-3~" Utah Code Annotatedt 1953~ which
provides as fol]ows:
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~~ ( 5)
All rights-of...way for any and all purposes mentioned in section 7g....34..1 hereof~ and any
and all structures and improvements thereon~ and
the lands held or used in connection therewitht shall
be subject to be connected with~ crossed or intersected by any other right-of-way or improvem-ent or
structure thereon ; they shall also be subject to a
limited use in common vri th the owners thereof~
when necessary ; but such uses of crossings, inter~
sections and connections shall be made in the manner
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and
the least private injury.'~

The foregoing provisions \Vere designed expressly for
a situation su eh as that involved here. Appell ant recognizes
the right of the Road Commission to cross its branch. A
separation of grade will be necessary, but that is being done
at railroad crossings throughout the whole country. It may
require that the freeway be e1evated, but that likewise is
being done in many places, and particular l.Y right in the
heart of Salt Lake City. It may require a greater expenditure than the destru(..1ion of Rio Grande's Little Cotton wood
Branch. But 've have never understood the law to be that
increased cost justi iies an unlawful taking~
The Road Commission has contended in this cause that
it may take Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch under
the provisions of Subsection (3) of said Section 78-34-3. The
answer to this contention, ho,Never, !ie.g in the proposition
that the Road Commission is firmly bound under Subsection
(3) by the constitutional limitations and statutes here considered. \Vh atever may be sho,vn \Vi th respect to more
necessary public use does not enlarge the po,ver of the Road
Commission to take appellant'R property. ~\s "iYC have sho,vn
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the attempted taking here is unlawfuL It is no less unlawful

even though a greater public use may be

involved~

POINT IV
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH
OF RAILROAD IS AN UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH COMMERCE.

Ever ~ince the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Gibb01tS v. Ogden, 9 Wheat4 1, 6 L. Ed. 23,
the principle has been firmly established that the states are
without power or authority to impede substantially the
flow of commerce from state to state. See Southern Pacific

v4

af Arizonat 325 U. S.

65 S. Ct. 1515~
and collection of cases at pages 1519-20 of S. Ct. Reporter.
Compare Denvc1· & Rio Grande Railroa-d Company v. City
and County of Den~~(~l', et al.i' 250 U. S . 241.

Company

State

761~

In the case at bar the judgment of the trial court does
not regulate or interfere vr.ith interstate traffic on the
branch in question, it absolutely terminates that traffic.
The volume of such traffic for 1957~ 1958, and the first
two months of 1959 i8 shown on defendant~s Exhibits 14,
15 and 16, and .summarized in the statement of facts above.
Wbile the volume of such traffic is not large in comparison
with that moving on appellant's main line} it is nevertheless
substantial and appears to be increasing.
The Road Commission by destroying the connection of
the branch into the rna in line destroys the branch itself and

terminates all traffic moving over the branch. In principle
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this case is like that of Kansas City S ou.tkern Railway Company v. Kaw llaUey Drainage DistrictJ 233 U. S. 75, where
the action of the state agency destroyed a bridge on the line
of the railroad, V{ hich was held by the Supreme Court to be
an t1nla wful interference with commerce.

POINT V
INDISPENSIBLE P A R T I E S DEFENDANT
WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION.

"\V e recognize the general rule that a party "'"ho is
joined may not complain of t'he non-joinder of a necessary
or indispensible party. It is clearly established, however,
that the proceedings are nugatory as to parties who have
not been joined. Levris, Eminent Domain, Third Editiont
Vo1ume 2~ Section 538.
The case at bar does not present the ordinary situation
of the condemnation of a tract of land. The branch in que&
tion is a highway.. Oregon ShoTt Line Railroad Co . v. Murray City~ 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P ~ 2d 798~ Connections to this
highway by industries and individuals U8ing the branch
are valuable property right~~ The condemnation of the
branch destrojrs these rights~ Without joinder of these parties the proceedings are nugatory as to them~ Their property cannot be taken in this proceeding. These propositions
only serve to further demonstrate the invalidity of the taking in questiont and the wisdom of invoking the provisions
of S u bseetion ( 5) of said Section 78-34-3.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of condemnation of the Court below
ould be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

S. N. CORNWALL,
VAN COTT_, BAGLEY,
C.QRNW ALL & McCARTHY,
AttnYJU~ys

for Defendant
and Appellant..
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